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Introduction 
  N
egotiating agricultural trade liberalization across domestic subsidies, export 
subsidies and market access disciplines has proven to be a difficult exercise. 
Exacerbating this difficultly, the Doha Development Agenda added to the discussions 
special and differential treatment for developing countries. With so many 
controversial issues being simultaneously discussed, it should come as no surprise that 
the World Trade Organization’s Committee on Agriculture failed – at the Cancun 
Ministerial in September 2003 – to secure agreement on the negotiating modalities 
that were to guide the rest of the agricultural negotiations during the Doha 
Development Round. What is most alarming is that if the agricultural trade 
negotiations can be so easily stalled over these issues, then as trade tensions 
associated with complex sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures increase
1 the 
agricultural trade negotiations in general are at significant risk. This article presents an 
assessment of why SPS measures are sure to increase agricultural trade tensions and 
discusses the implications for agricultural trade policy.  
There are two interrelated reasons why SPS measures represent a complex 
challenge for agricultural trade policy. The first reason is associated with the power of 
the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement): a 
legitimate SPS measure confers on a member the unilateral right to ban any type of 
product from any source, and this right cannot be challenged under international trade 
law. The second reason is associated with the ambiguity surrounding the wielding of 
the agreement’s power: essentially, there remains uncertainty as to what a legitimate 
SPS measure consists of.
2  The latter reason ensures that various interest groups will 
seek to capture the definition of what constitutes a legitimate justification in order to 
harness the considerable unilateral power of the SPS Agreement. 
The SPS Agreement 
P 
rior to discussing the power of the SPS Agreement and its continuing ambiguity, 
it is useful to consider both the nature of SPS measures and the background to the 
international trading system, including how the agreement emerged within this 
system.  
SPS measures include human, animal and plant safety and health regulations that 
a particular country may put into place as a result of domestic political economy 
reasons.
3 Trade tensions arise because – given the divergent political economy factors 
– countries often differ in how and what they regulate, resulting in SPS-related market 
access barriers. In recognition of this potential source of market access barriers, the 
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SPS Agreement was developed under the World Trade Organization and came into 
force in January 1995.  
The intended objective of the agreement was to discipline the use of SPS 
measures in order to simultaneously ensure human, animal and plant safety while 
preventing such measures from becoming disguised agri-food protectionism. The 
actual effect of the agreement has been to illustrate just how contentious is the overlap 
between trade liberalization rules and domestic safety and health regulations. For 
example, the EU regulations prohibiting the use of growth-promoting hormones in 
beef production were a market access barrier preventing Canadian and U.S. beef 
exports to the EU (because under Canadian and U.S. regulations the use of growth-
promoting hormones was approved as safe). Canada and the United States both 
challenged the EU regulations as a violation of the SPS Agreement obligations and the 
WTO agreed. However, the EU has effectively ignored the ruling and the market 
access barriers remain. That is, when domestic SPS regulations and international trade 
rules overlap, it is at the cost of the multilateral trading system. Similarly, in August 
2003, at the request of Canada and the United States, a WTO dispute settlement panel 
was established to rule on the SPS market access barriers that were preventing 
Canadian and U.S. exports of genetically modified crops from entering the EU (Isaac 
and Kerr, 2003b). In addition, Canada – which discovered a single case of BSE in 
May of 2003 – faces SPS market access bans on its beef exports despite the efforts it 
has taken to identify, isolate and eradicate the risk. Economic diplomacy has not 
worked, frustration grows and questions about the legitimacy of the continued SPS 
bans may soon be raised at the WTO. 
The original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1948) was built on 
the principle of non-discrimination (PND), a function of the following three concepts:  
1.  the national treatment provision (article I), which states that foreign products 
must be treated like domestic products;  
2.  the most-favoured nation principle (article III), which states there should be 
no discrimination between products originating from different countries; and  
3.  the distinction between processes and production methods (PPMs) and 
products, whereby all ‘like products’ were to be treated the same regardless 
of the PPM used in their production.  
These principles essentially mean that ‘like’ products must be subject to the same 
regulations in a particular regulatory jurisdiction regardless of their origin or the PPM 
used. The focus on like products was to prevent the often significant differences in 
levels of technological development between trading partners from being used as 
barriers to market entry. For example, the like-products concept implies that a cotton 
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shirt produced in an organic agricultural system is like a cotton shirt produced in an 
intensive agricultural system; market access rules are not permitted to distinguish 
between the two types of cotton shirts.   
The GATT 1948 was, however, unclear on the issue of inconsistencies between 
trade rules and domestic food safety measures. Signatory countries held significant 
discretion to establish their own food safety and food quality regulations according to 
a number of the GATT articles. For instance, article XI specifically permitted 
regulations setting out national “standards or regulations for the classification, grading 
or marketing of commodities in international trade.” Article XX(b) permitted the 
adoption or enforcement of measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life 
or health. In an attempt to be consistent with the PND, the discretionary measures 
invoked under articles XI and XX(b) were not to be applied in such a manner as to 
cause arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries or disguised 
restrictions on trade. However, this specification did not provide any discipline on the 
type of measure that could be implemented. 
The SPS Agreement: A Powerful Treaty 
T 
he SPS Agreement emerged from the convergence of many different interests, all 
frustrated with the discretionary and arbitrary food safety measures applied under 
the GATT 1948. These interests ranged from food exporting countries and 
multinational food processing and distributing companies that shared a common 
concern about market access barriers facing food trade to consumer organizations that 
wanted to ensure that, as food products were increasingly traded, some minimum 
standards of safety would prevail (Isaac, 2002). Therefore, the objective of the 
agreement was to specifically outline permissible types of trade-restricting measures 
that WTO members may enact in order to protect human, animal and plant safety and 
health from the import of unsafe agricultural products.
4  
The inalienable right of members to protect human, animal or plant safety and 
health is enshrined in the agreement:
5  
No member should be prevented from adopting or enforcing measures 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health arising from  
• the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying 
organisms or disease-causing organisms; 
• additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in food, 
beverages or feedstuffs; and 
• diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof (SPS Agreement, 
annex A). 
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Accordingly, if a legitimate justification exists
6 members may restrict or prevent 
imports through the use of mandatory sanitary and phytosanitary measures. In fact, 
there are three important provisions of the SPS Agreement – differing from traditional 
trade principles – that support the unilateral establishment of SPS measures by 
members. 
First, under the SPS Agreement, members may discriminate against imports 
because of the presence of risks in the exporting country (SPS Agreement, article 2:3). 
The agreement recognizes that different regions with different geographical conditions 
and agronomic practices face different incidences of pests and disease. As a result, it 
may not be possible or necessary to establish uniform SPS measures to apply to all 
exporters according to the PND. Instead, trade measures may need to specifically 
target those imports that may contaminate the domestic food supply, while other 
imported agricultural products may not face the same measures. Hence, members are 
not required to grant either national treatment or most-favoured nation status to 
agricultural exporters whose products may contaminate the domestic food supply. 
Second, according to the agreement, members may also establish domestic SPS 
measures higher than the accepted international standard if there is legitimate 
justification to do so (SPS Agreement, article 3:3). Generally, international trade 
agreements commit members to adopt international standards if available; however, 
the SPS Agreement permits members to establish even higher standards. That is, the 
SPS Agreement creates a regulatory floor but not a regulatory ceiling.  
Third, under the SPS Agreement, members may establish provisional SPS 
measures based on precaution, in the event that there is insufficient scientific evidence 
to conduct an appropriate risk assessment. The agreement states the following:  
In cases where the relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member 
may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of 
available pertinent information, including that from sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures applied by other Members. In such circumstances, 
Members shall seek to obtain additional information necessary for a more 
objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary 
measure accordingly within a reasonable amount of time (SPS Agreement, 
article 5:7). 
That is, members are permitted to establish trade barriers based on the 
precautionary principle. These barriers can remain in place until sufficient scientific 
evidence has been compiled to assess the risk.  
Therefore, a member country with a legitimate justification for an SPS-related 
measure wields considerable international trade power: the unilateral right under the 
WTO to impose trade barriers that cannot be challenged by other members.  
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The SPS Agreement: Ambiguity 
W 
hile the power of the SPS Agreement makes it attractive to a wide range of 
interest groups (and virtually ensures that it will be invoked to impose a host 
of market access barriers), it is the ambiguity surrounding how the SPS Agreement is 
appropriately interpreted and applied that creates significant trade controversies. 
Hence, it is crucial at this point to define what is meant by a legitimate justification for 
an SPS-related market access barrier and the problems that remain with this 
justification.  
Legitimate justifications for SPS-related market access barriers are those that are 
scientifically sound. According to the agreement, unilateral SPS measures must be 
“based on scientific principles” and cannot be maintained “without sufficient 
scientific evidence” unless they are temporary, precautionary measures (SPS 
Agreement, article 2:2). The science-based measures adopted must be proportional to 
the risk that is being targeted.  
It is important to note that the WTO does not determine the sufficiency of 
scientific evidence. Instead, it defers to one of three international scientific 
organizations. For food safety, the relevant international institution is the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (CAC), for animal safety, the International Office of 
Epizootics (OIE) and for plant safety, the International Plant Protection Convention 
(IPPC) (SPS Agreement, article 5:1). Sufficient scientific evidence would be evidence 
that conforms to the standards or standard-setting procedures of these three 
organizations. The agreement states the following: 
In the assessment of risks, Members shall take into account available 
scientific evidence; relevant processes and production methods; relevant 
inspection, sampling and testing methods; prevalence of specific diseases 
or pests; existence of pest- or disease-free areas; relevant ecological and 
environmental conditions and quarantine and other treatment (SPS 
Agreement, article 5:2). 
Hence, the SPS Agreement requires members to provide scientific justification for the 
adoption of measures where the scientific justification is crucial in supporting the 
legitimacy of the domestic measure in the event of a trade challenge.  
When a Member has reason to believe that a specific sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure introduced or maintained by another Member is 
constraining, or has the potential to constrain, its exports and the measure 
is not based on the relevant international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations, or such standards, guidelines or recommendations do 
not exist, an explanation of the reasons for such sanitary or phytosanitary 
measure may be requested and shall be provided by the Member 
maintaining the measure (SPS Agreement, article 5:8). 
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Consider a trade dispute over the use of a food safety measure. The WTO Dispute 
Settlement Panel seeks the scientific advice of the Codex Alimentarius Commission. 
Without an acceptable scientific justification, it is unlikely that a trade dispute 
decision by a WTO dispute settlement panel or an appellate body will support the 
unilateral SPS measure. In this sense, even if members do not adopt international 
standards, it is important that for domestic food safety measures to be legitimate they 
must remain congruent with the international risk analysis approach of the CAC in the 
event of a trade dispute.
7  
At first glance, it may appear that the provisions in the SPS Agreement are well 
specified, leaving little room for controversy; however, there are several important 
sources of ambiguity. For example, while the PND limits the focus of trade rules to 
‘like products’ it is obvious that some SPS-related risks may, in fact, be associated not 
with the end-use characteristics of a product but rather with the processes and 
production methods (PPMs) employed. Indeed, this is at the heart of the WTO trade 
disputes over beef hormones and genetically modified crops (Isaac and Kerr, 2003a). 
In both cases the European Union has banned products from North America based on 
PPM technologies that Canada and the United States argue have no impact on the end-
use characteristics of the final product. The agreement is relatively silent with respect 
to the legitimacy of PPM-based SPS market access barriers, and greater clarification is 
required.   
According to the agreement’s article 5:7, members may adopt temporary, 
precautionary bans to prevent the introduction of risks when sufficient scientific 
evidence is absent. The problem here does not lie with this provision; indeed, it is a 
necessary provision that empowers all members to act to protect human, animal and 
plant safety and health in the event of a perceived crisis. The problem lies, rather, with 
how to remove the provision once it is triggered. The SPS Agreement is silent on the 
steps that need to be taken by a member country that has lost international market 
access because trading partners have invoked this provision. For an example, consider 
the current case of Canada. With the discovery of a single case of BSE, Canada 
immediately lost access to 34 markets that – quite legitimately – established 
temporary, precautionary bans. Since that time, Canada believes that it has identified, 
isolated and eradicated the risk that any BSE-infected animals will enter the food 
supply. Further, animal health experts (with the OIE) have vetted the Canadian 
response. Yet many important markets remain closed or are only partially open.
8 The 
ambiguity here arises because of an absence of a harmonized blueprint for the opening 
of markets after temporary, precautionary bans have been invoked. Greater 
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clarification is required in the SPS Agreement on how long is ‘temporary’ and on the 
quantity and type of scientific evidence that is deemed sufficient.   
Another source of ambiguity arises from the fact that the SPS Agreement sets a 
regulatory floor but not a ceiling. According to the agreement, members are 
committed to both the international harmonization of SPS measures (subject to the 
three international scientific organizations) and the mutual recognition of measures 
employed by other members. With respect to mutual recognition, a member is 
committed, in principle, to granting equivalence to the SPS measures adopted by an 
exporting country “if the exporting Member objectively demonstrates to the importing 
Member that its measures achieve the importing Member’s appropriate level of 
sanitary or phytosanitary protection” (SPS Agreement, article 4:1). To facilitate the 
process, the importing member must be allowed to conduct a conformance assessment 
including inspection, testing, monitoring and evaluation of the measures in place in 
the exporting member country. The problem here is that – provided that the national 
treatment provision is met – the agreement is silent on the limits that exist for 
countries to have their regulations substantially above those of other member 
countries. Indeed, this issue is related to the discussion above, because many of the 
markets that continue to ban Canadian beef products – such as Japan – have domestic 
traceability and slaughtering regulations different from Canada’s. Therefore, while 
there is a minimum level of sanitary and phytosanitary measures that must be met, is 
there a maximum defining the point that importing member countries cannot 
legitimately expect potential exporting members to achieve?  
Another source of ambiguity is associated with the role of socio-economic 
considerations in risk assessment. The SPS Agreement permits members to establish 
SPS measures based on scientific risk as well as on broader assessments of risk such 
as relevant economic factors, including  
   the potential damage in terms of loss of production or sales in the event of the 
entry, establishment or spread of the disease or pest; 
   the costs of control or eradication in the territory of the importing Member; and  
   the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to limiting risks (SPS 
Agreement, article 5:3).   
Trade agreements traditionally avoid such socio-economic assessments because of the 
subjectivity complications associated with them. Indeed, it has been argued that the 
WTO attempts to depoliticize trade and make it a function of comparative advantage 
by insulating trade agreements from socio-economic assessments (World Trade 
Organization, 1995). However, the SPS Agreement recognizes that imported risks to 
human, animal and plant safety and health are likely to have socio-economic impacts 
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that can be perhaps quite significant. The inclusion of this article raises significant 
ambiguity about how socio-economic assessments may be worked into the legitimate 
justifications based on sufficient scientific evidence. None of the international 
scientific organizations deferred to by the WTO provide much scope for socio-
economic assessments, so it is unclear how and when they may be included in a 
legitimate fashion.  
This assessment of the SPS Agreement reveals that while the agreement grants 
members considerable power to take unilateral and unchallengeable trade actions 
against other members if they have a legitimate justification to do so, there is 
significant ambiguity associated with what constitutes a legitimate justification and, 
hence, when and how this power might be appropriately wielded. Yet, as will be 
discussed in the next section, modifying the agreement to deal with such issues 
presents a complex challenge for agricultural trade liberalization efforts.  
Systemic Agricultural Trade Issues  
W 
hile it has been argued above that the SPS Agreement is likely to play a 
preeminent role in agricultural trade disputes and, hence, greater clarification 
of the outstanding areas of ambiguity is required, achieving this clarification is 
difficult for two reasons.  
Agreement on Agriculture 
SPS Market Access Issues
Doha Development Agenda: Agricultural Negotiations & SPS Agreement












SPS Agreement  TBT Agreement 
Outside the CoA’s remit
 
Figure 1  Agricultural negotiations and the SPS Agreement  
 
First, achieving clarification of the SPS Agreement’s ambiguous rules vis-à-vis 
agricultural market access is difficult because, as figure 1 depicts, the SPS Agreement 
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plays an exogenous role with respect to the Agreement on Agriculture. Indeed, the 
agreement was omitted from the Ministerial Declaration of the Doha Development 
Agenda and it was not part of the mandate of the Committee on Agriculture. As a 
result, the focus of the agricultural negotiations has been on the traditional domains 
and no attention has been paid to the SPS Agreement. It is important to note that 
“opening up” the SPS Agreement is not without risks. Indeed, the EU’s bad 
experience with the SPS Agreement and the beef hormones issue (likely to be 
repeated again with the genetically modified crops issue) has led the EU to propose 
changing the agreement to make it more like EU-style regulations (and less like U.S.-
style regulations). Nevertheless, despite the tough negotiations that would follow, the 
SPS Agreement does require modification.  
The second systemic agricultural trade issue that makes the modification of the 
SPS Agreement difficult is the special and differential treatment for developing 
countries offered in the Doha Development Agenda. This inclusion fundamentally 
changed the dynamic of agricultural negotiations. The Cairns Group was essentially 
marooned as the developing-country members – led by Brazil – formed the G22 
negotiating bloc in order to stand apart from the developed Cairns Group members 
and claim an entitlement to special and differential treatment in agriculture. This is 
problematic for the SPS Agreement because on the issue of safety and health there 
should be no special and differential treatment; ensuring safety and health should be 
the goal of all agricultural producers regardless of their level of development. Yet 
domestic interests in developing countries looking for protectionist justifications may 
be attracted by the power of the SPS Agreement and its ambiguous rules. The result 
may be an increased use of special and differential SPS-related market access barriers, 
which are effective in barring food trade yet may have little effect upon actual safety 
and health.  
Implications for Agricultural Trade 
G 
iven the significant unilateral power it confers and the ambiguity associated with 
how this unilateral power is appropriately wielded, it can be expected that the 
most complex and challenging tensions related to agricultural trade will be under the 
auspices of the SPS Agreement. The agricultural trade policy issue is that the 
agricultural trade liberalization efforts – stalled by the traditional issues of domestic 
subsidies, export subsidies and market access disciplines – appear unable to take on 
the complex challenge of SPS trade disputes unless modifications are made.  
To ensure that the unilateral power of the SPS Agreement is wielded in a manner 
consistent with maximizing public health while preventing unnecessary trade 
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distortions, the agreement requires full characterization of what constitutes a 
legitimate justification for SPS-related market access barriers. This may involve a 
coordinated effort both to ensure that any modifications to the agreement are focused 
solely on the issues of safety and health and to avoid focusing on issues beyond this. It 
could include, in addition, a coordinated effort to ensure excellence in the 
establishment of scientific standards and scientific standard-setting procedures at the 
various international scientific organizations.
9 The goal of such efforts would be to 
establish universal regulatory floors based on scientifically sufficient parameters of 
safety and health while avoiding SPS-related measures on any non-safety issues, 
including on the basis of special and differential treatment. That is, greater effort must 
be spent on finding the floor of minimum essential requirements that all countries can 
agree to, after which all other measures are subject to trade disciplines. In addition, the 
appropriate use of temporary, precautionary bans must be characterized, including the 
development of a framework for regaining markets that have been closed due to 
precautionary SPS measures.  
Clarifying what constitutes a legitimate justification for an SPS-related market 
access barrier will simultaneously ensure that such barriers are not simply used as 
disguised protectionism. Bringing the SPS Agreement fully into the negotiating 
agenda of the Committee on Agriculture would begin to deal explicitly with the 
relevant market access issues. Yet, as discussed above, when opening up the 
agreement, it is crucial that human, animal and plant safety and health dominate the 
agenda and not non-safety issues. The goal here would be to prevent the discretionary 
use of temporary and permanent market access barriers with no clear outline of how to 
regain market access by clarifying the principles underlying the risk analysis 
framework used in determining appropriate SPS measures. To aid this process, better 
methods could be developed to quantify non-tariff market access barriers in order to 
facilitate their reduction through negotiation. Another area of coordinated effort could 
target the precautionary principle outlined in the agreement’s article 5:7. 
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Endnotes 
                                                       
1.  The World Trade Organization’s Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures tracks specific trade concerns (STCs) that are brought to the committee’s 
attention by any member country concerned about the SPS-related market access 
rules established by another member. Since January 1995, 154 STCs have been 
raised, 26 percent related to food safety concerns, 30 percent to plant health 
concerns, 40 percent to animal health and zoonoses and 4 percent to other issues 
such as certification requirements or translation (World Trade Organization, 2003).  
2.  Some examples include the types of processes and production methods (PPMs) 
that can be focused on and those that cannot; the appropriate use of temporary, 
precautionary import bans and their subsequent removal; and the role that 
international scientific organizations play in setting the international safety and 
health standards (or, in the absence of actual standards, the appropriate procedures 
for setting domestic safety and health standards). 
3.  Differing domestic political economy reasons can be the result of several factors 
(Isaac, 2002). First, there may be cultural differences in risk perceptions, as 
evidenced by the avoidance of pasteurization of cheese in France and the 
widespread use of pasteurization of cheese in North America. Second, influencing 
risk perceptions are experiences with food safety in various jurisdictions (Spriggs 
and Isaac, 2001). For example, the BSE crisis in British beef, the dioxin 
contamination in Belgium and the E. coli contamination in Scotland have each had 
a lasting effect upon consumers’ risk perceptions. Third, jurisdictions differ in their 
regulatory traditions and the emphasis they place upon actual and/or perceived 
risks when making regulatory decisions.  
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4.  Unsafe imports can jeopardize human safety and health either directly, in the case of unsafe 
imported foodstuffs, or indirectly, by infecting domestic food inputs including livestock 
and agricultural plants that are part of the domestic food chain. There is a crucial distinction 
to note: the SPS Agreement targets measures taken to protect the domestic food supply, not 
measures taken to target overall domestic biodiversity. In this sense, the SPS Agreement 
relates to food safety measures only, not environmental protection measures, although in 
practice this distinction is blurred.  
5.  Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations Legal Texts (the “SPS Agreement”), 
preamble, pp. 69-84. 
6.  The meaning of a legitimate justification will be discussed below.  
7.  For a comprehensive assessment of the Risk Analysis Framework and the many 
debates associated with its appropriate use see Isaac (2002).  
8.  In September 2003, the USDA announced that Canadian producers could export 
boneless meat from animals younger than 30 months to the United States; 
however, trade in live cattle or boned meat cuts was not reinstated.   
9.  While the focus of this paper is on the SPS Agreement, it is important to note that 
the scientific organizations themselves – the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the 
International Office of Epizootics and the International Plant Protection 
Convention – are not above criticism. For instance, further research may be done 
on the organizations themselves in terms of whether or not they are actually 
capable of establishing scientific standards or standards-setting procedures that are 
timely and not unduly influenced by political considerations. Therefore, while 
modifications to the SPS Agreement highlighted in this paper may be thought of as 
necessary conditions for a better functioning trading system they may not be 
sufficient conditions, as subsequent modifications to the scientific organizations 
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